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RETAILERS' BUYING: THE MARKET PROSPECT
Judgments about market conditions—the speed with
which deliveries will be made, the certainty of obtain-
ing good selections (especially of the season's favorite
models), the direction in which prices will move—are
highly relevant to the question of when retailers place
their orders for the season's requirements. On the char-
acter of these judgments depends action of economic
interest, for the judgments change from time to time,
and with them change the patterns of buying.
How Buying Fluctuates with Changing Market
Prospects
Changes may be subtle or gross. "Buying booms"—
real overbuying sprees and the collapse that inevitably
follows—are only the unusual and very extreme mam-
festation of a very common phenomenon, "buying
waves," which result from the constant re-evaluation
by businessmen of conditions expected to materialize
in the markets in which they buy. Before endeavoring
to analyse these expectations and their impact on buy-
ing, I would like to draw a portrait of the buying boom
of late 1936 and early 1937. There we find, blown up
for easy vision, the components of the milder shifts in
market position that lack the drama but not the im-
portance of the showier events. The account is based
on reports primarily from two trade journals, the Shoe
and Leather Reporter and the Boot and Shoe Re-
corder.1
A BUYING BOOM
Throughout 1935, trade reports tell of the struggle of
producers to raise shoe prices in line with the advance
in leather prices; it eventuated in the mild rise in
wholesale shoe prices that the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics index shows started almost imperceptibly during
the first half of the year and reached a temporary peak
in February of 1936. During this period we read of the
occasional placing of larger than usual advance orders
by distributors. By January of 1936, "...thesales
reported done at the shoe convention were reported
by many as the largest they had ever had, notwith-
1Bothof these publications are weeklies. The Shoe and
Leather Reporter (SLR), from which most of the material
comes, is published by the Shoe and Leather Publishing Co.
of Boston and has been in existence since 1857.
standing the fact that prices were higher on most every
line represented." 2Thepause in buying that followed
in the next few months and sent prices down agnin was
attributed to the fact that the trade was waiting for
improved retail sales that did not eventuate, tn part
because of the cold February and March. But iri April
the trade reported marked increase in demand for
practically all types of footwear at retail, as well as the
presence of trading up and multiple purchases. ".
depleted[retailers'] stocks which looked abnormally
large previous to the [consumer] buying movement
may have the effect of creating more anticipation
buying than has been experienced in recent months."
Now it was a weakness in the hide and leather markets
that put off the retailers' buying spree. Seasonally ad-
justed hide prices had been declining slowly since
January.
In the last half of the year, however, strength de-
veloped from both sides—the price of hides and that
of leather resumed their climb, and retail demand was
at a high level, the highest since early in 1931 in dollar
terms, and the highest on record in pairs. Retailers
placed a flood of "at-once" orders: they are not only
reported in the press, but clearly reflected in the index
of wholesale sales of shoes, which, in seasonally cor-
rected form, rose from around fifty-one in April and
May to around sixty-five in the closing months of the
year. Apparently, retailers were anxious to buy because
they had underestimated demand and found their
stocks too low—stocks were low, that is, not in absolute
terms, but low relative to what it was thought that they
should be. As early as June 1936, key buying acOounts
were finding it necessary to enter the markets for re-
plenishment, despite the fact that their early season
orders had exceeded, by a comfortable margin, the
previous season's purchases. The note of betterment in
excess of expectations was sounded again and again.
The rush to get merchandise, doubtless partly due to
underestimated consumer demand, was also due to
worry about the prompt delivery of orders. "Shoe
manufacturers were not keen to commit themselves for
extended periods and were doing their best to hold
buyers down to 60 or at most 90 days' delivery. Cn the
other hand buyers, desirous of getting prompt de-
2SLR,January 18, 1936, p. 29.
SLR, April 18, 1936, p. 51.114 CHAPTER9
livery on their lines, were apparently more concerned
about getting shoes shipped than they were in wasting
time trying to get prices down." In spite of reports that
sales were in excess of expectations and stocks re-
quired replenishment, all this resulted not only in rising
stocks, but in stocks that rose faster than sales, for the
indexes show sales-stock ratios turning down in October
and November of 1936. But though the slack in the
rope had been taken up and tension was developing,
shoe prices had not yet started to move; for only three
of the twenty-one models canvassed by the BLS had
price increases been reported by December• 1936.
It was not until the first of the next year that whole-
sale shoe prices broke loose—in February, increases
were recorded for fifteen models. Consumer demand
had continued to rise and was at a high level, though
the rate of its advance had slackened. Shoe manufactur-
ers were frequently reported operating at capacity, a
fact borne out by the over-all statistics. In late January
1937"...anumber of [shoe manufacturing] leaders
[report] inability to take any further business for early
spring cutting....Regularbusiness [was] being ac-
cepted only on a basis of delivery when completed,
manufacturers being unable, due to the present rush, to
promise specific delivery dates."The higher prices of
leather were pressing heavily, and with considerable
uniformity, on the cost structure of shoe manufacturers.
The SLB comments in February 1937 that shoe manu-
facturers had supplies of leather thought ample for the
season's needs but unusual factory activity had dissi-
pated supplies and forced buying of leather at higher
prices. (Average leather prices rose over 43 per cent
between August 1936 and April 1937.) Moreover, "Tan-
ners of various descriptions of leather, which usually
are considered on a par for quality, are nearer together
in their ideas of leather value than has been the case in
many years. Production and raw stock costs now play
a more important part in asking figures than for many
seasons past." This "... maywell indicate the ap-
proach of a more universally observed policy of replace-
ment selling." Indeed, "...severaloutstanding pro-
ducers presented the same identical prices for sizable
orders of shoes made to definite quality specifica-
tions."
Retailers were trying to accumulate larger stocks.
"Retail shoe buyers are displaying some eagerness to
build up spring stocks Again in March, "Dis-
tributors of footwear are replenishing stocks on staples
as rapidly as possible, anticipating broader call for
SLR, December 5, 1936, p. 12.
SLR, January 23, 1937, p. 16.
SLR, February 13, 1937, p. 3 (italics mine).
SLR, January 23, 1937, p. 16.
such types. A number are endeavoring to build reserves
against possible higher prices or production schedule
interruptions which are expected with further spread of
labor controversies." 8 In fact, by January, conditions
were becoming alarming to some observers: "An ele-
ment of danger in the situation, as indicated by the
[shoe]Fair, was the speculative interest in shoes
bought for inventory. One manufacturer said, 'Many of
my smaller merchant customers selling less than three
thousand pairs of shoes a year have tried to place orders
for fifteen hundred pairs in one sitting.'" Buyers, it was
reported, "...attemptedto place more business than
they could properly handle in the hopes of getting
wanted shoes on time for early Easter
The desire to increase stocks was part of a specula-
tive fever that ranged wide: "Evidence that markets are
headed toward definitely higher levels continues to ac-
cumulate from week to week. It is apparent that all
branches of the industry, beginning with the small
collector of raw materials at remote country points, and
extending to the retail distributor of footwear located
in large metropolitan cities, believe that prices will rise.
They are imbued with the idea that inflation, while it
has already arrived, will carry prices to still higher
levels. In view of this fact, they can see no good reason
for selling themselves out of a future profitable posi-
tion." 10
It is interesting to note that, in all of this passion to
buy, there are no complaints about difficulty in getting
funds with which to acquire inventory. Indeed, the
complaints run the other way—the editors of both the
BSR and the SLR complain of an improvident abun-
dance of credit: "Many a merchant is in a perilous posi-
tion today with a madness to stock up to the limit be-
cause banks and businesses are a trifle more tolerant of
expansion for growth."An editorial in the SLR in
March warns of undercapitalization of shoe manu-
facturers, pointing out that if formerly $1,000 cash capi-
talization was deemed necessary to produce a case of
shoes, now the figure ought to be increased by 20 per
cent.12
All through the late winter and spring, shoe prices at
wholesale and retail continued to rise. In the words of
an editorial in the SLR, "Concentrated efforts of the
industry which for months were centered on the one im-
portant objective of raising prices in the retail end of
the business, are beginning to bear fruit."
8 SLR, March 13, 1937, p. 16.
Boot and Shoe Recorder (BSR), January 9, 1937, pp. 15
and 22.
10 SLIt, April 3, 1937, p. 3 (italics mine).
11 BSR, January 30, 1937, p. 22.
12 SLR, March 6, 1937, p. 3.
13 SLR, May 1, 1937, p. 3.RETAILERS' BUY1NG—2 115
But contemporaneously with this happy announce-
ment come words of warning. The International Sta-
tistical Bureau, late in March, calls attention to reports
from retailers that sales, though good, were somewhat
below expectations. A week later the theme is struck in
a different key—retail shoe volume has not shown in-
creases reported at wholesale. About the same time the
SLR notes that"... thereare definite signs of easiness
in raw and finished materials which bodes ill for some
sections of the industry if continued for an extended
period." 14 Leather and hide prices ceased to increase
at an accelerating rate in March or April, though they
did not break until August. Early bargain sales were
reported by some retail stores, and manufacturers com-
plained about the absence of "at-once" orders.
Nevertheless, this seemed to be interpreted by many
of the bigger distributors as a temporary weakness,
perhaps similar to the one that had occurred the year
before. For toward the end of May, "Reports were
current in shoe manufacturing and distributing quar-
ters during the past week to the effect that volume
buyers had placed a moderate to good sized volume of
business on staple or semi-staple types during the past
ten days....Severalof the key buying organizations
who have been sitting on the side lines waiting for mar-
ket easiness to run its course, took advantage of the
situation to place orders for part of their requirements
for the fall season. While the details are closely guarded
it is understood that slight concessions were made
where sizable business was involved but following the
booking and the recovery of raw stock and finished
material manufacturers changed their attitude with
respect to future business." '5 Indeed, there is other
evidence that advance orders were placed in unusual
volume as late as June. One large buying group, for
example, placed orders in May and June that amounted
to 75 per cent of its sales for the five months of August
through December, and this in spite of the fact that the
ratio of current sales to stock plus orders outstanding
had been falling sharply since December of 1936.
By July, however, the buying spree was definitely
over. Wholesale sales had reached their peak in March.
Shoe prices were, as usual, slow to react (the whole-
sale price index held its own, and the retail price index
showed a continued rise, until October). Several large
popular-priced chains that had instituted price in-
creases as late as May rescinded them in August.
Late summer and fall exhibited the usual postboom
symptoms. Shoe manufacturers complained about the
absence of at-once orders and about demands for price
rebates. However, their demands for price concessions
14 SLR, May 1, 1937, p. 3.
15 SLR, May 29, 1937, p. 34.
were not as insistent as on a notable earlier occasion,
when Frank Rand, President of the Shoe
Co. spoke of the calamitous situation during the last
six months of 1920. The International Shoe Co. did not
guarantee prices, as did many manufacturers at that
time; they would grant no rebates; "We had every
excuse on earth given, from the baby being sick to crop
failure, why the shoes that we had shipped should not
be kept at the prices at which we had sold them." A
tardy account sent a telegram asking what to do. The
wires rang back, "'Walk the floor, that's what i'm do-
ing." The account sent $500afew days afterward with
a "cheerful" letter, the postscript to which was not so
cheerful: "If you think there is no trouble down here,
with the bottom having dropped out of cotton, if you
think there is no trouble down here send your ixouble
man down and find out."Yet the John Henry4ike ca-
dence of this message produced, apparently, ueither
the trouble man nor the rebate.
Retailers complained that consumers were not buy-
ing, that repair trade was unusually good, that special
sales of new merchandise were announced at the height
of the season. Stocks in the hands of would-be sellers
cumulated. In retail stores, the statistics show no abso-
lute rise, but presumably there was a rise relative to
desired stocks. On the other hand, finished leather held
by tanners rose (after adjustment for the usual seasonal
patterns) by about 1,650 thousand equivalent hides (or
52 per cent) between April 1937 and January 1938.
Packers' hide stocks, which reached their seasonally ad-
justed low in August, rose by 300 thousand hides in the
next five months; indeed, for the next two months some-
thing like half the current kill appears not to have been
disposed of. In November, Swift & Co. endeavored to
break the stalemate by announcing that they would sell
only one week's production of hides each week until
the market was ready to absorb inventory reduction
••inan orderly manner
This it began to do around the beginning of the year.
We hear once again of more sizing and at-once orders.
The attendance at the January shoe fair was thought
good, though it was characterized by a close-range
policy of buying. Percy Straus of R. H. Macy, for ex-
ample, announced that though his firm usually placed
orders six months in advance, this year the period was
cut in half.'8 But very shortly we start to hear that
though buying isstill cautious, it is better thanex-
pected; thesharp drop in hide and leather prices,
having recently slowed down, presently turned; and
thus the first rifts in the clouds appear.
16 SLR, February 2, 1922, pp. 45—47.
17SLR, November 6, 1937, p. 57.
18 BSR, January 8, 1938, p. 17.116 CHAPTER9
BASIC CHARACrERISTICS: OVERBUYING VERSUS SHIFTS IN
ADVANCE-ORDER RATIO
From this eyewitness account, one basic character-
istic of the flow and ebb of a buying wave is clear
enough: as the wave reaches the flood, retailers buy
more than they would require to provide for and service
current consumer buying; as it ebbs, they buy less. In
the case of a buying boom, retailers may place orders
for far more than they actually expect to buy. But
this alternation of over- and underbuying is, as far as I
can judge, a central characteristic of only a fairly ex-
treme buying movement in the finished-shoe markets,
though it may be present in small measure even in mild
departures from hand-to-mouth buying.
In the milder buying waves, overbuying is largely
relative. Here the amount of shoes bought well ahead
of time (in the preseason months) increases rela-
tive to the orders of shorter term: the advance-order
ratio rises. This may take place without overbuying for
the season as a whole. Yet the judgment about the pro-
portion of expected sales for the season, which should
be placed as the preseason order, is as much influenced
by a consideration of market prospects with respect to
prices and the ease and speed of obtaining merchandise
as is the judgment that lies behind the over- and under-
buying that characterizes a real splurge and its after-
math. This portrait of a buying boom is, then, simply
somewhat of a caricature of a personality type that is
usually found with a far more moderate expression—
that of a buying movement.
That it is actually so found is suggested by what we
are told by retailers and shoe manufacturers. They say
that consideration of market prospects will cause a
change in the proportion of the expected season's sales
ordered early rather than late. Some shoes, of course,
are bought early in any market. A situation described
as hand-to-mouth buying might mean, for example, that
about 30 or 35 per cent of the expected sales for the
next season are bought when manufacturers' salesmen
start to show their new lines; secondary orders, placed
a month or two later, might also be a bit smaller relative
to the last-minute orders. On the other hand, in a
seller's rather than buyer's market, the proportion of
preseason buying may move to 65 per cent or more. In
times of true speculative furor, the 60 per cent figure
may, as we have seen, rise to 100 or even higher as
individual merchants, expecting to receive only a frac-
tion of what they have ordered, commit themselves for
several times what they can use.
This is, of course, a vastly oversimplified description
that glosses over all sorts of differences. The 65 per cent
figure is a nonhomogeneous composite. For highly
staple shoes, for which substantial price concessions
may accompany the off-season order, as much as 100
per cent of expected requirements may be bought
ahead when market conditions are reasonably tight. In
the case of models for which hopes are high, advance
purchases may exceed those of the less-favored num-
bers. Delivery terms of individual manufacturers will
also influence dealers' orders. Moreover, even if the
same proportion of the expected requirements for the
total six-month period are purchased ahead, the time-
distribution is often different for staple numbers and
style numbers; for the latter, the proportion of shoes to
be sold within the next three months may be relatively
high.
Even the word "order" is ambiguous. Sometimes ad-
vance ordering isless formal than the "confirmed"
order. The buyer of a large firm may inform a "re-
source" that he expects to require a given number of
pairs in the course of a season; then, though the retailer
is not committed, the manufacturer may reserve factory
space. In the "blanket order," space is definitely booked
but the articles are not specified until later. Sometimes
unconfirmed orders are quite specific as to styles and
sizes but, because they exceed the open-to-buy posi-
tion, are placed "on the cuff." Orders of this sort rest on
an understanding between individuals, and carry what-
ever weight such understandings have been found to
warrant in the past.
But in spite of inevitable haziness, the most satis-
factory way to phrase the concept is in terms of the
shift in the proportion of expected requirements or-
dered earlier rather than later. First, we want to dis-
cover what evidence there is of the presence of these
shifts; second, why and how they occur; third, what
pattern they impart to total buying, and consequently
to the backward transmission of demand.
Statistical Evidence that Shifts Have Occurred
Starting with the first question, we search the statis-
tical record for evidence as to when markets seem to
have moved away from a hand-to-mouth position and
how extreme the movements were. Ideally, we require
a time series on a state of mind—on how actual stocks
differ from what they would have been had market
prospects been perfectly stable, that is, from what they
would have been had there been no change whatever in
actual or expected delivery periods, in ease of obtain-
ing adequate selections, in shoe prices, or in any other
factors commonly considered in a decision on how
much to buy earlier rather than later. What data we
actually have will soon be all too evident.
THE MARKET PROFILE
I have assembled the group of materials presented
in Chart 21 partly in desperation and partly in sport.RETAILERS' BUY1NG—2 117
CHART 21
Twelve Indicators of When Market Positions in Shoes Changed, 1926—1940
Indicators
I. Stock turnover, all retailers, pairs
2. Stock turnover, all retailers, dollars 2
3. Stock turnover, all retailers, pairs 3
4. Stock turnover, all retailers, dollars
5. Stock turnover, deportment stores, dollars 5
6. Stock turnover, deportment stores, dollars 6
7. Stock turnover, wholesalers, dollars 7
8. Commitment turnover 8
9. Hypothetical orders, IV 9
10. Hypothetical orders, V 10
II. Change in commitments II





1. Stock turnover, all retailers, pairs
2. Stock turnover, all retailers, dollars 2
3. Stock turnover, oIl retailers, poirs 3
4. Stock turnover, all retailers, dollars 4
5. Stock turnover, department stores, dollars 5
6. Stock turnover, department stores, dollars 6
7. Stock turnover, wholesalers, dollars
8. Commitment turnover 8
9. Hypothetical orders, IV
10. Hypothetical orders, V 10
II. Change in commitments 11
12. Change in commitments 12
192619271928192919301931193219331934193519361937193819391940
Method of construction of the market profile: Net market extensionis obtained by subtracting the number of indicators in retrenchment from the
number in extension each month. Periods of market retrenchment are identified by behavior converse to that described below for periods of extension.
Market extension is suggested by the following eight indicators when the turnover ratio (sales divided by stock) is in falling phase and sales in rising
phase:
1. Shoe distributors' stock turnover in pairs (59) and retail shoe sales inpairs (33)
2. Distributors' stock turnover (59) and retail shoe sales in dollars (31)
3. Turnover of shoe stock in all hands (58) and pair shoe sales (33)
4. Turnover of shoe stock in all hands (58) and dollar shoe sales (31)
5. Department-store shoe stock turnover in constant prices (55), whichisbased on the stockseries derived from sales andreceipts, and
department-store shoe sales in dollars (28)
6. Department-store shoe stock turnover in constant prices (56), which is based on a directly reported stock series, and dollar sales (28)
7. Shoe wholesalers' stock turnover in constant prices (57) and their dollar sales (36)
8. Turnover ratio of stock and outstanding orders in dollars of a department-store group (confidential) and their salesindollars; the data
begin in 1936
Market extensionis suggested by the following two indicators when sales rise faster than orders. The two series comprising the indicatori are:
9. Wholesale sales in pairs (37) and hypothetical orders IV
10. Wholesale sales in pairs (37) and hypothetical orders V (for description of IV and V, see Chapter 8, "Hypothetical Stable Market Orders")
Market extension is suggested when investment is rising while soles are changing at a rate lower than that of the average incremental sales-stock
ratio, or at a decreasing rate:
11. Retailers' investment in stock on hand and on order (53) is compared with manth.to-month change in pair shoe sales (33)
Market extension is suggested when investment is rising while sales are changing at a decreasing rate. This indicator shows no periods of market
retrenchment:
12. The same two series are compared as in indicator 11 (see text note 22 for a further discussion of these two indicators)
Periods of Extension
— — — —
— —
— — —
• — • — — — — — —
— —— — — — —
— — — — — — — — — —— — — —
I I I
Periods of Retrenchment — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
—— — —
— — — — —— —
— — — — — — — —
— — — — —— —
— — — — — — —
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Exploiting to the full the slightest logical relation of
actual data to the question at issue, I simply add up the
evidence of each rickety construct and look at the
result. It seems to make sense, more is the wonder.
Three sorts of materials are used. The inclusion of
each is based on an argument that may be briefly out-
lined. The first seven indicators are based on sales-stock
ratios and the eighth on a ratio of sales to stock on order
as well as on hand. Characteristically stock, whether on
hand or also on order, rises and falls with sales, and
consequently turnover ratios parallel sales. However,
there are notable exceptions to this pattern. When sales
are rising and the ratio falling, it seems reasonable to
assume that this rise in the number of weeks' supply
held in stock on hand or on order represents an in-
tended extension of the market position motivated by
consideration of market prospects; for at such times
(unlike times when sales are falling), if retailers wish
to reduce either their stocks or their commitments, they
can. Conversely, when sales are falling, yet stocks on
hand and on order start to turn more rapidly, contrary
to the usual pattern, it seems reasonable to assume that
a volitional shortening of the market position is taking
place, though, of course, it may well have been taking
place earlier without being visible.'9 The same logic
that we apply to stock plus commitments may likewise
be applied to stock on hand alone.20 In accordance with
this line of thought, we denote as periods of market ex-
tension the times when sales are rising and the ratio of
sales to stock and commitments is falling, and as periods
of market contraction the times when sales are falling
and the ratio of sales to stock and commitments is
rising. Each of our turnover ratios, judged in connec-
tion with appropriate data on sales, yields a set of re-
ports on shifts in market position.
The logic of the next two indicators is simply that if
we could get a series on orders under stable market
prospects and subtract it from total orders, the differ-
ence would be orders associated with shifts in market
prospects. Accordingly we compare our two hypothet-
ical stable market order series developed in the pre-
vious chapter with our best representation of total or-
ders—wholesale sales. Since the levels of the two series
are not the same, comparison must focus on rates of
change. Market extension is deemed to occur when
total orders (wholesale sales) are rising and those pred-
icated on constant market prospects are rising more
slowly or falling; conversely, market retrenchment is
deemed to occur when total orders are declining and
those based on constant market prospects are declining
more slowly or rising.
The final set of comparisons is the most highhanded
of all. It is based on a hypothetical series for change•
in retailers' stock on hand and on order (ownership
position) calculated by subtracting retailers' sales from
their orders (again represented by wholesale sales).
The ratio of first differences in sales to this series (hy-
pothetically, first differences in ownership position) 21
may, we noted in the previous chapter, stay fairly
steady under stable market prospects. Marked depar-
ture from stability may, therefore, be attributed to mar-
ket extension or retrenchment due to shifting market
prospects.22
Looking now at Chart 21, there seems to be a rough
tendency for the horizontal bars indicating periods of
market extension as shown by each of the indicators to
cluster more often than not in certain periods. But
there is some suggestion that the series in which stock
on order as well as on hand plays a part give their signs
ahead of the others. The same may be said for periods
of retrenchment The market profile is simply a count
21 This difference series cannot be converted to an aggregative
one for the error is too considerable to allow for cumulation
over more than short periods of time.
22 The incremental sales-ownership ratio will have an average
level, and we are interested in departures from the average.
We judge that market extension occurs, for example, when the
rate of change in ownership position and that in sales are
both in rising phase but the slope of ownership is steeper rela-
tive to sales than is indicated by the average relationship; the
incremental sales-ownership ratio isless than average. Other
aspects of the procedure can be summarized as follows:
19 By the same logic, it would theoretically be possible to spot
in the figures the effort to decrease stocks before turnover ac-
tually started to speed up. But to do so, we would need to
know how much turnover declined due to the sorts of factors
discussed in the previous chapter, and we cannot say this any
more than we can make the corresponding statement on how
much turnover usually rises when sales rise.
20 Of course, it would be quite possible for retailers to in-
crease the amount of stock on order without ever increasing
the amount on hand, but it is more likely that before long stock
on hand would increase, too. Again, the only way that an
increase can be identified as associated with a consideration
of market prospects is after turnover starts to fall while sales
are still rising; the more subtle matters of the extent of parallel
change being past our power to evaluate. These statements
may be rephrased to apply to evidence concerning a contraction





























where r is the ratio ofsales divided byownership, over each
matched specific subcycle, and R isthe average of these
ratios for all phases.RETAILERS' BUYING—2
of how many of these twelve indicators show the pres-
ence of extension minus the number that show the
presence of contraction. The logic of the summation is
this: I regard each of the series as an observation on the
presence of a shift in market position. When more of
these fallible indicators agree that a certain sort of
movement is taking place, I conclude that the judgment
is more certain and the movement probably stronger
than when fewer do so. In view of the fact that seven
of the indicators would presumably operate at a
slightly later stage than the other five, their concurrence
may also mean that the shift has matured.
These waves in advance buying or advance position,
the chart shows, are not merely occasional occurrences
but take place most of the time. I would guess that
most retailers or shoe manufacturers would have said
of the period covered by the chart that hand-to-mouth
shoe buying had been the rule except in the last part of
•1936 and early 1937, and possibly in the very early
days of the Naticnal Industrial Recovery Act, in 1933.
The hide and leather markets would have been de-
scribed as also off a hand-to-mouth basis in 1927 to
1928. Journals kept reporting resistance by shoe buyers
in 1928 and the difficulty of passing on higher leather
costs to them. This may be why the profile fails to show
strong market extension at that time; but of course the
data, particularly for the first few years, are highly
fallible.
SEASONAL PATrERNS
Because retailers ordinarily place most advance or-
ders for shoes in certain months, the buying of these
months would presumably be heavier relative to that
of the others when positions are being extended and
smaller when dealers are returning to hand-to-mouth
buying. Advance buying is not likely to occur before
the new lines have been designed and shown—seldom
earlier than November for the spring season or May
for the fall season—or after the rush work starts in early
February for the spring, and in August for the fall,
semester.25 By and large, then, when business is good
and factories are expected to be busy, a larger propor-
tion of the year's orders should be found to have been
placed in November, December, early January, May,
and June than are placed in these months at times
when factories are expected to be fairly empty. Since
such a shift implies a lengthened ownership position
for retailers, it constitutes the expansion phase of a
buying wave.
A good series on orders each month would serve to
test whether buying has this seasonal pattern. But we
do not have such a series; nor can wholesale sales or
I describe the patterns for the interwar period. They may
have moved in recent years.
combined shoe and leather orders serve the purpose be-.
cause of the probable difference between their seasonal
patterns and those of shoe orders. Instead, I use shoe
production. The large majority of shoes are manu.fac-.
tured only after an order has been received. For much-
of the rest, decisions as to the volume to be produced.
are often closely geared to the flow of current orders,
though orders and output are not individually matched..
Finally, insofar as shoe manufacturers depart from their
usual seasonal pattern to put a larger than usual pro-
portion into production early rather than late without:
definite orders for them, they are taking the same sort:
of gamble as shoe retailers and for much the same rea-
sons. Accordingly, it seems proper to assume that the
difference between average seasonal patterns of shoe.
production and those found at various phases of a buy-
ing wave will parallel analogous differences for orders.
received by shoe manufacturers.
To test whether such differences occur, I assume, as a.
first approximation, that extension of market position
occurs at high levels of output when delays are feared.
and not at low levels; and contrariwise for retrench-.
ment. Consequently, evidence of buying waves would.
be present if a larger than usual proportion of
(and by imputation, orders) occurred in preseason.
months when the level of output is high and a smaller
proportion when it is low; conversely, the proportion
done in months close to the seasonal peaks would be.
expected to be inversely associated with output. Shoe.
output for, say, January in any specific year is, accord-
ingly, divided by output for the surrounding twelve.
months. This figure is plotted against the twelve-month
output figure (after adjusting the latter for a straight-
line time trend; the adjustment is supposed to allow
roughly for changing plant capacity). The procedure.
is repeated for each of the twenty-one Januaries cov-
ered by the index from 1922 to 1942. If the twenty
located points lie in a more or less horizontal band, we
may conclude that Januaries do not tend to be higher.
in active years relative to the aggregate output for the
surrounding year than in inactive years. If the dots.
slope upward to the right across the page—thus hay-.
ing positive regression coefficients—the monthly out-.
put ratios are positively associated with the cyclical
level of operation; if they slope downward, the asso-
ciation is negative and coefficients have a negative.
sign.
We find upon inspection of Table 36 (columns S and
5) that the months with the five highest positive coeffi-.
cients (the only ones for which the correlation coeffi-.
cient is over zero) are November, December, January,
May, and June, just the ones in which preseason.
buying was usually done, though January may be late,
at least for the larger stores. On the other hand August:120 CHAPTER9
TABLE 36
Association of Seasonal Patterns of Shoe Production with the Level of Output, 1922—1942
AVERAGE RATIO OF REGRESSION OF RATIOS ON SEASONAL INDEX
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October 9.08 3 —.0014 10±0.0054 .0 109.0 —0.9
November 7.27 11 +'.0088 3±0.0052 .29 87.2 +6.7




nt of rank correlation —.94
100 5.1
a The ratios are simple averages, 1922—1942, of the ratio of production (series 39) for a given
month to the total of the 12 surrounding months.
b The regression of the ratios (described in note a) on production adjusted for its straight-
line trend (see text for further discussion).
The figures are simply the average ratios in column 1 multiplied by twelve. They thus are not
the same as the average seasonal correction applied to shoe output which was done with the aid
of a moving seasonal adjustment.
d The estimates were made by applying the regression coefficients to the average amplitude of
specific subcyclical fluctuation in shoe production, which was 65.4 million pairs, and converting
the calculation to the basis of a seasonal index.
The figures for 1931 and 1933 were very eccentric, and since there was reason to believe the
circumstances exceptional, they were excluded from the correlation.
Average, ignoring signs.
and September (September is a seasonal peak in con-
sumer buying) have clear negative slopes. The rest of
the months have standard errors in excess of the coeffi-
cient of slope.
Another rather striking aspect of these computations
follows from the fact the preseason months are also the
ones when factory output is low, work on the old styles
having ceased and work on the new ones being not yet
vigorously under way. This means that when produc-
tion is relatively high in preseason months—that is, in
good years—the valleys in the flow of production are
somewhat leveled. In other words, the seasonal index is
damped in good times relative to poor ones. When
months are ranked first for the height of their seasonal
indexes and then for the slope of the regression coeffi-
cients, the rank correlation coefficient is sharply nega-
tive (—.94). Column 8 of the table suggests that the
quantitative aspect of this damping is not negligible.
For what it is worth, the average increase of indexes for
the lower months and decrease for the higher months is
about 5 percentage points in the course of the average
subcycical rise of production.24
-24The finding raises an interesting question about techniques
of seasonal adjustment. If our hypothesis is correct, the observed
I conclude that these calculations seem to add the
weight of their evidence to that of the market profile
and trade news in testifying that distributors alternately
extend and contract their ownership position in shoes.
What can be learned of the cause of these shifts?
Cause of Shifting Market Positions
Certainly the explanation, if pushed to the level of
basic cause, is extremely complex. There isvery little
that happens in the course of a business day that does
not help to form expectations about market prospects
upon which shifts in ownership position are predicated.
Included in relevant happenings would be all contacts
between buyers and sellers, news of purchases and
sales and the prices at which they are consummated,re-
ports of salesman, information about stocks of custom-
ers and suppliers or of events in other markets and in
the world at large. But though the basicprocess
whereby expectations are formulated is vastly complex,
differences in seasonal patterns among years of high and of iow
output can be cyclical or subcycical phenomena. Amplitude cor-
rections or most sorts of moving seasonals would relnove a good
bit of this pattern.RETAILERS' BUYING—2 121
worthwhile insight can be gained by concentrating at
quite a superficial level.
INFLUENCE OF EXPECrATIONS CONCERNING DELIVERIES,
SELECrIONS, AND PRICES
The maze of final factors converge on two simple
questions: Are wholesale shoe prices going to rise (or
fall)? Will merchandise of the requisite type and
quality be difficult (or easy) to get at the last minute?
In actual practice, both questions are likely to evoke
the same answer at any given time. This is important,
since actually only one or the other is often considered.
One buyer will eschew price considerations though he
admits good merchandising obviously requires that
more goods be bought early at some times than at
others; another buyer will claim that it is sensible to
take the expected course of prices into account and buy
early when prices are expected to rise and late when
they are expected to fall.
Several different sorts of factors could contribute to
the resultant tendency for orders having relatively long
delivery terms to form a larger proportion of all orders
in good times than in bad. In good times, the bargain-
ing position of sellers is strong relative to that of buyers,
and sellers prefer early orders, which permit more
economical factory operation. In good times, buyers
TABLE 37
anticipate slower deliveries for three reasons: it takes
longer for orders to be put into production; a longer
time is required to complete production; stocks of
finished shoes from which immediate deliveries can be
made are relatively small.25 These stipulations apply
with special force to the season's more popular models.
25 Finished-goods inventories typically have inverse cyclical
patterns, and, as far as I can judge, those of shoe factories are
no exception.
I can produce no direct evidence on the extent to
which any of these factors are present at different times,
though the question would be a most interesting one to
investigate.
A few quantitative explorations can, however, be
made of the second type of reason for shifting market
positions—an expected change in prices. A buyer stands
to gain the amount by which prices rise over a period
for which he has a true option concerning when to buy
the goods that he expects to sell at some more or less
specific future time. For style goods, which are rede-
signed each semester, the option is at best the few
months between the preseason and the late season
order; for staples, it might be somewhat longer; but for
shoes, six months are probably the outside limit. In Ta-
ble 37 we calculate the advantage that might have ac-
crued as the result of taking this maximum gamble on
the basis of true clairvoyance. For the purpose of this
rough approximation, we ignore interest, storage, and
other costs of carrying merchandise. The difference be-
tween the two columns of wholesale prices shows the
advantage that the retailer would have gained had he
bought at the best possible moment (though no longer
than six months ahead). I assume that retail price
would have been based exclusively on the last minute
purchase price (the price plus a gross margin of 40 per
cent of retail). Actually, had a sizable number of retail-
ers purchased shoes at the advantageous prices, the re-
tail price would probably not show as much as a40per
cent margin over current wholesale prices, since re-
tailers who had bought at a lower price would typically
convert at least part of their price advantage into a
competitive advantage through lower retail prices.26 Be
26 The figure of 40 per cent is at best highly approximate. It
is probably high for maintained margin and iow for an initial
Opportunitiesto Increase Retail Margin by Correctly Anticipating Rise in Wholesale Price of Shoes
by as Long as Six Months, 1926—1941
WHEN BEST ADVANCE SELLING PRICE CROSS MARGIN ON
CURRENT MONTH WHEN PURCHASE MIGHT
SALE IS TO BE MADE HAVE BEEN MADE
Wholesale Wholesale
Date Price a Date Price a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FIGURED AT SHOES PURCHASED IN ADVANCE
40% MARKUP % of Excess over
WHOLESALE PRICE Index Points Retail Price 40% Margin
ON DATE OF SALE b (5) —(4)(6) ± (5) x100(7) —40%
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Nov. 1927 106.3 May 1927 99.9
Oct. 1933 98.9 Apr. 1933 83.2
Dcc. 1935 100.1 June 1935 97.3
June 1937 107.5 Dec. 1938 99.4
May 1939 101.3 Nov. 1938 100.4
Feb. 1940 108.2 Aug. 1939 100.8
Oct. 1941 118.8 Apr. 1941 107.8
177.2 77.3 43.6 3.8
164.8 81.6 49.5 9.5
166.8 69.5 41.7 1.7
179.2 79.8 44.5 4.5
168.8 68.4 40.5 0.5
180.3 79.5 44.1 4.1
198.0 90.2 45.6 5.6
Average 4.2
a Prices are Bureau of Labor Statistics indexes of the
sale price of boots and shoes (1926 = 100; Series 1 in
dix B).
whole- b See column 2. The markup of 40 per cent is calculated on
Appen- retail selling price (SP). It is, therefore, the purchase price
(PP) divided by 0.60 (SP=PP+0.4OSP).122 CHAPTER9
that as it may, on the basis of the extreme assumption
that the entire advantage was taken in the form of
additional margin, and ignoring interest, storage, and
other such costs, we can see what the retailer stood to
gain by taking the chances incident to advance buying.
Under these extreme assumptions, apparently, the ad-
ditional margin that would have rewarded the advance
buyer would have been almost 10 points on goods pur-
chased six months ahead during the rapid price rise
associated with the NRA, and almost 6 points in the
early days of the war. At three other times in the
twenty-year period, additional margin of around 4
points might have been achieved.
If for the same periods analogous calculations are
made for shoe wholesalers, Table 38 is developed. The
liquidate his mistakes by reducing his own prices. Fi-
nally, the businessman to whom he sells is probably
more readily enticed by a bargain, knowing one when
he sees it, than is the consumer.27
Though these figures suggest that retailers and cer-
tainly wholesalers can improve their profits if they can
foretell prices and act accordingly, the advantage to the
retailer, at least, is not spectacular, even under the ex-
treme favorable assumptions behind the calculations.
When we consider how, in actual life, the recorded gain
will be whittled by carrying charges and wrong guesses
as to the amount and timing of price change and by the
purchase of merchandise that can be sold only after
severe markdown, it would seem that unless a retailer
feels very certain of the trends of the market, price ad-
TABLE 38
last column in this table may be compared with that of
Table 37. The wholesaler not only stood to increase his
margins by a larger per cent of selling price than did
the retailer, but potential speculative gain represented
a far larger proportion of average margin for the whole-
saler than for the retailer, since a given price advantage
in dollars represents a larger proportion of a 15 per cent
than of a 40 per cent margin. In general, the larger the
ratio of materials to total costs, the greater the induce-
ment to engage in price speculation, other things the
same. Actually, the wholesaler may well have further
advantages over the retailer when it comes to price-
oriented buying. Because wholesalers' shoe stocks turn,
on the average, perhaps two or two and a half times as
fast as retailers', the wholesaler's prospect of gain per
dollar of capital invested in inventories would be that
much greater. Also, he may be in a better position to
markup, and it is hard to say which of the two concepts is
called for by the context.
vantage alone would be a feeble reason for taking an
extreme advance position. But, as we have seen, the
price motive does not need to work alone. It tends to
be paralleled by the need to make sure that seasonable
merchandise will be available in the right quantities
at the time when it is required by customers.
The price motive in early buying may operate in part,
at least, in a way that does not involve the retailer in a
guess about the future course of prices. It seems to be
usual for early orders, especially large ones, to be
written at a lower price than later ones. In part this
reflects the fact that such orders facilitate a smoother
and consequently more efficient factory operation with-
out the gamble of anticipating customer requirements.
This would be present, good times or bad. But some
of my discussions with people in the trade have sug-
gested an interesting path for further investigation—Is
27 This point was made a long while ago by Simon Kuznets in
Cyclical Fluctuations: Retail and Wholesale Trade, United States,
1919—1925, Adeiphi, 1926.
Opportunities toIncrease Wholesale Margin by Correctly Anticipating Rise in Wholesale Price of Shoes
by as Long as Six Months, 1926—1941
WHEN BEST ADVANCE SELLING PRICE GROSS MARGIN ON
CURRENT MONTH WHEN
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15% MARKUP OVER % of Excess over
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125.1 25.2 20.1 5.1
116.4 33.2 28.5 13.5
117.8 20.5 17.4 2.4
126.5 27.1 21.4 6.4
119.2 18.8 15.8 0.8
127.3 26.5 20.8 5.8
139.8 32.0 22.9 7.9
Average 6.0
a Pricesare Bureau of
sale price of boots and
dix B).
Labor Statistics index of the
shoes (1926 =100;series 1 in
whole- b See column 2. The markup of 15 per cent is calculated on
Appen- the selling price of the wholesaler (SP). It is, therefore, the pur-
chase price (PP) divided by 0.85 (SP=PP+0.15 SP).RETAILERS' BUYING—2 123
the reward for early orders larger in good times than in
bad? I think it may be for several reasons. If a manu-
facturer expects to be booked to capacity in the peak
months, early orders may represent an absolute gain in
the year's output in addition to the advantage of pro-
ducing more efficiently, and thus provide a double ad-
dition to operating profits.28 Furthermore—a matter of
psychology and management mechanics—when prices
are rising, the reward of early orders may be the op-
portunity to buy at the old prices, and such offers may
be made more readily than the offer of a corresponding
opportunity in a falling market—a price lower than
that of the still-unannounced new line. Finally, an ad-
vantage of early orders to the manufacturer, which may
in part be passed on to his customer, derives from his
ability to buy leather early, and therefore at a lower
price, without taking the gamble as to whether the par-
ticular sorts of leather will be required. Whether the
corresponding opportunity to take a short position in
leather in a falling market operates symmetrically is
not clear.
But if it is true that shoe manufacturers would be
more inclined in good times than in poor to offer a
sizable discount for an early order, it will presumably
be uncertainty as to whether the market will continue
to rise (rather than the experience of an actual rever-
sal) that will make the manufacturer chary of offering
more than the minimum actual off-season operating
economies to an advance buyer. For one thing, he can
no longer feel reasonably sure that he would benefit
from early leather buying; for another, if the market
breaks, his customers' advance orders may not remain
firm, thus rendering him a double loser, for cancella-
tions and requests for price rebates are old enemies of
the trade. Time and again when prices appear to have
reached levels that are deemed high in absolute terms,
and when other reasons for uncertainty seem to have
appeared, we read of shoe manufacturers (and tanners,
too) being unwilling to accept customers' orders more
than sixty days in advance, if the shift in the direction
of inventory change depends on uncertainty, it will
occur earlier than if a full-blown reversal in sentiment
is required.
Shifting buying prices for distributors raise the ques-
tion whether the defensive action of earlier or later buy-
ing may focus on expected operating margins rather
than simply on the expected wholesale price of shoes.
Unfortunately, there is no way of investigating this
question empirically, for we have no relevant infor-
28 There may also be a special advantage that characterizes
times of very low output, though I would think it might be of a
lesser order: when the absolute level of production in the slack
months is very low, there may be a greater per unit advantage
to raising the level and thus to keeping personnel together.
mation on retailers' gross or net margins.29it were
available, however, it is likely that if percentage mar-
gins on a last-in-first-out basis moved at all, they would
tend in the short run to move inversely to the wholesale
price of shoes. Extension or contraction of the market
position would provide a method of defending margins
against a cost squeeze in a rising market. One would
assume that the critical question may involve the limits
to which movements could be tolerated.
It is desirable to try to find some objective evidence
of the validity of the line of explanation that has been
forwarded. But how may we hope to find external
evidence on expectations about prices, speed of de.
livery, and wealth of selections? Although well-de-
signed questionnaires and surveys might supply per-
tinent information, none has been undertaken. Only
time series are available, and they could hardly be very
informative,
Still they may not be entirely without meaning. For
example, if retailers need to guess whether shoe prices
are going to rise or fall, they will look at the prices of
basic raw materials whose cost represents a large por-
tion and also a highly variable portion of the cost of
shoes. For this purpose hide prices may even be su-
perior to leather prices, since the latter are known to
move with the former and hide prices are more prompt
and reliable indicators. Because the advantage of early
buying is a function of the change in shoe prices, it
might be the change in hide prices that is watched. A
comparison of time series may suggest an association
between the basis of expectation (recent changes in
hide prices) and resultant action (market extension as
shown in the profile).
Insofar as speed of deliveries and wealth of choice
determine the willingness to order ahead, the level of
demand must help to influence opinions. I been
told that if sales are not good, retailers simply cannot
be interested in early ordering. Similarly, the level and
rate of change of factory operation, since they are con-
siderations in judging how rapidly goods will be re-
ceived, are relevant to when they should be purchased.
Wholesalers' sales seem to be thought good
cators of market conditions by several people with
whom I have spoken. However, except for retail sales,
they could and indeed must be an effect as well as a
cause of shifts in the market position of retailers. In line
with the discussions of the previous chapter, not only
29 Annual figures on gross and maintained margins for shoe
stores are available in selected years and annually from 1928
for shoe departments of department stores. But annual figures
are of no help for this purpose. Comparison of the retail and
wholesale shoe price indexes shows general similarity with
occasional differences for which no rationale appears. Neither set
of data, especially the retail one, is accurate enough to provide
a reliable record of differences between them.124 CHAPTER9
the level but also the rate of change in sales must in-
fluence expectations.
In spite of all the difficulties and qualifications it may
be useful to compare some of these time series that logic
suggests might help to formulate opinion with the re-
suits of opinion—shifts in market position as reflected,
however imperfectly, in the market profile and seasonal
pattern of production.
EVIDENCE OF THE TIME SERiES
In Chart 22 and Table 39 the market profile is com-
pared with selected series. Inspection of the chart sug-
gests considerable parallelism between the profile and
the rate of change in retail sales and hide prices. The
table sharpens this and other comparisons. Though
many subcycles are not in like phase, the average devia-
tion is small indeed (1.4 months) for those turns in
the rate at which hide prices change, matched with
corresponding ones in the profile. For change in re-
tail sales, the average deviation for the considerable
number of matched turns is not notably small, yet only
27 per cent of the months are in unlike phase (a small
figure for series with as many subcycles as these). The
correspondence with wholesale sales is quite
30Itdoes not seem at all likely that the correspondence is
significantly a function of the fact that wholesale sales play some
part in the computation of five of the twelve indicators. In













Specific-cycle turns are marked by X, specific.subcycle turns by 0, and retardotions by
See notes to Chart 21 for method of construction of market profile and calculation of net market extension. First dif-
ferences are centered five-month moving averages of month-to-month change.
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TABLE39
Timing of Subcycles in the Market Profile Compared with Selected Series, 1926—1940
But the most interesting thing brought out by the table
is the pervasive timing lag—the tendency, in other
words, for the profile to lead the several activities and
the reference scheme. That it should lead retail sales,
production, and the reference scheme is in line with the
theory. Its association with the rate of change in sales is
also not contradictory.h1 Somewhat more puzzling is
the association with change in hide prices, which, when
read as recent changes in hide prices, do not show the
expected lead.32 Were a reliable "market profile" to
show this timing relationship, one would ask whether it
might not reflect in part the impact of changes in buy-
ing on prices rather than vice versa.
The thought that the rate of change in hide prices
may influence judgments about future changes in
leather prices, as well as reflect other events that influ-
enced these judgments, can also be tested in the frame-
work of seasonal patterns. Changing market prospects
may shift seasonal patterns in buying by increasing the
relative importance of the preseason months in good
times. If positive association appears between years
when hide prices rose rapidly prior to the preseason
months and years when preseason buying represented
a larger than usual proportion of the year's total, it will
at least not conflict with the thesis that retailers' ob-
servations of the behavior of hide prices had influenced
their buying. To test whether this may have been the
case, the ratios of output to the surrounding twelve
months (the same dependent variable previously used)
were correlated with changes in hide prices; to hold to
the logic of the association, we use prices of the pre-
vious severalmonths.
Table 40 shows that although all the correlation co-
efficients are positive, reflecting the general correla-
tion of prices and production, the three highest coeffi-
cients are in June, December, and November, months
when preseason orders are typically placed. But views
can hardly depend on recent rates of change in hide
prices alone. Certainly the level of sales is also a clue
to how busy factories will be and therefore how rap-
idly orders can be delivered. The rate of change in
sales too—reflecting, as it is likely to, the e,ttent to
which sales were better or worse than expected—will
influence opinions about future prices and delivery
conditions.23
There is another line of association, too. The argtiment of
the previous chapter links recent rates of change in to the
corrective order, and these orders may well be especially tin-
portant in governing output of the immediate post-peak months
MONTHS IN
UNLIKE I5HA5E b AS
% OF ALL. MONTHS
NUMBER OF TURNS




Lead (-'--) All Mean
Turns Total Leading Lagging Sgnchronous Lead (—)Average
or Lag (+) Deviation
or Lag (+)
(months)(%
(1)(2)(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
REFERENCE FRAME: MARKET PROFILE (23 TURNS) e
SLH-subcycle reference chronology d 22 16 2 12 2 +2.6 2.2
First differencesin prices:
Shoe(1) 26 15 3 12 0 +2.7 2.1
+3 29
+3 33
Leather (19) 18 14 3 9 2 +0.9 1.9 +1 34
Hide (23) 26 15 4 7 4 +0.3 1.4 0 32
Retail shoe sales, pairs (33) 24 16 4 12 0 +1.6 2.1
First differences einretail shoe sales25 20 13 5 2 —1.4 1.9
+2 30
—2 27
Shoe production (39) 24 14 3 7 4 +0.9 1.8
Wholesale shoe sales, pairs (35) 22 16 2 10 4 +1.1 1.2
0 34
+1 24
"For the niles used in matching subcycle turns, see Appendix d See Appendix A, sec. 8.
A, secs. lOa, b, c and d. eCenteredfive-month moving averages
b See Appendix A, sec. 14. change.
CSeetext and Chart 21.
of month4o-month
on the indicator and certainly not with the lag that appears in the
association between the profile and wholesale sales.
Thetiming in the table is for a centered five-month average,
and theory links the profile to recent experience of change. This
calls for an average stated on the last rather than the center
month, and a three-month average of first differences (change in
sales between the third previous and the current month) may be
preferable to an average of longer term. For this three-month
average, stated onlast month, 17 turns may be matched with
the profile; 11 lead and 6 lag and the average timing is a lead
of 0.6 month relative to the profile.
32 Even for the three-month average (change between the
current month and the fourth previous month), average timing is






























Following up these ideas, we try an explanation of
the production ratios month by month on the basis of
all three factors. Now, as the second column shows, all
the coefficients (after adjustment for lost degrees of
freedom) are higher than when hide prices alone were
used; June and December are still the months with the
highest coefficients of multiple correlation, but third
place goes to May rather than November, the fourth
month when preseason orders are placed, which
was snubbed by the previous calculation. Apparently
these comparisons, which are somewhat more delicate
than those based on our construct (the market profile),
assign a timing association to change in hide prices that
is consistent with a causal sequence that moves from
actual change to expected change to
Conclusion
Retailers' buying, these investigations suggest, can-
not be entirely accounted for by the effort to provide
for expected sales plus the intention of validating an
objective concerning the technically efficient size of
stock: there is a third element in efficient procurement,
the proper timing of buying. The proportion of the ex-
pected season's requirements that it is advisable to
cover by preseason orders is subject to frequent change
on the basis of estimates about how far ahead and how
reliably merchandise can be obtained, especially for
the seasonal peaks in sales, and how much cheaper
purchases can be made if they are set ahead or left
until the last minute.
This third set of considerations might seem to be in-
compatible with the notion of a firmly held stock ob-
jective based on physical efficiency. Actually, however,
the conffict does not arise most of the time, since mar-
ket prospects influence essentially the time when pur-
chases are made and need not influence stock at all.
Their economic importance arises from the line of
responses they set off in shoe production, in leather
buying, and in prices rather than necessarily in ac-
cumulation or decumulation of stocks of finished
shoes.
In activating market-prospect-linked buying, several
factors are likely to operate at the same time. Expecta-
tions that prices will rise tend to coincide with expec-
tations that delivery periods will lengthen, so that mar-
ket positions extend or contract at any given time for
either or both reasons. Also, both sorts of expectations
are not likely to flourish unless consumer buying and
industry activity are propitious. There are indications
in reports by businessmen, and no contradictory evi-
dence in statistics, that buying waves accord with the
level of consumer buying, with how the level relates to
expectations (often a function of its rate of change),
and with changes in hide prices, directly and as a re-
flection of all sorts of other relevant events. The net
result is that retailers' buying based on optimistic mar-
ket prospects is not independent of buying related to
changes in consumer buying, the associated desired
change in stock, or the need to correct errors in judging
requirements.
However, there are differences as well as similarities.
Market-prospect-linked buying tends to move in quite
short waves more like the duration of subcycles than
of business cycles. In part, the reason may be similar
to the reason that causes corrective buying to have the
same characteristic—a link to rates of change (rates of
change in prices as well as in sales), which seem to
may be held constant virtually removes this shift in seasonal
patterns.
TABLE 40
Association of Seasonal Patterns of Shoe Production with Hide
Prices and Retail Sales: Coefficients of Correlation, 1926—1941
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Change in Hide Prices
Change in and in Shoe Sales, and
Hide Prices a ShoeSales Proper a
703 R0.123
a Straight-lineformulae were used. Coefficients were corrected
for lost degrees of freedom. For each month in turn, the variables
are:
Xoproduction of shoes, pairs (39), ratio of current month
to total of twelve surrounding months,/ (0—, +
+ centered M0
=retailsales, pairs (33), sum of current month and two
• previous months, So + S—i + S-i, centered M0
= change in hide prices (23), sum of monthly change for
three months, P—1 —P—4,centered M—1
Xo = change in retail sales, pairs, three-month sum of three
months'change,(So —S—8)+ (S—1 —S—4)+ (S—, —
S—0),centered M0
rather than preseason months. This line of association maythere-
fore sometimes control or simply confuse the seasonal patterns
of rates of change in sales on market prospects. There is some
evidence of this double line of impact in the regression coefficients
for change in sales.
84 The association between cyclical and seasonal factors has
an interesting technical counterpart—the association between
seasonal and cyclical ones. In correcting shoe production for
seasonal patterns, a moving seasonal pattern was applied, since
seasonal patterns changed from time to time. The change was
greatest in the six early season months. I find now that the
multiple correlation in which the influence of the three variablestravel in short waves. In part it may be due to self-
limiting aspects of the process that explain both the
short periodicity of the buying waves and perhaps of
rates of change themselves. There have been hints of
127
suchlimiting factors in the boundaries imposed by the
season's requirements. Finally these buying waves typ-
ically seem to reach peaks and troughs early—before
retail sales or the output of shoe factories.
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